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WHOSE BODY?  WHOSE SOUL?  MEDICAL 
DECISION-MAKING ON BEHALF OF CHILDREN 
AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE BEFORE AND 
AFTER EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH 
B. Jessie Hill∗
ABSTRACT 
 
Within constitutional law, children’s rights have suffered from 
severe neglect.  The issue of parents’ constitutional rights to deny 
children medical treatment based on religious belief is one area in 
desperate need of attention.  Although the Supreme Court’s 1990 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith seemingly set forth a 
relatively clear rule regarding the availability of exemptions from 
generally applicable laws—such as those requiring parents to ensure 
that their children receive appropriate medical care—Smith has 
changed little in this realm, and if anything, it has only confused 
matters, highlighting the intractable nature of the issue.  While Smith 
emphasized the police power of the state over the individual’s religious 
motivations and revived the belief/conduct distinction, it also introduced 
the needlessly confusing concept of “hybrid rights,” which may 
encompass parental rights to control their children.  This brief Essay 
argues that the Free Exercise Clause is in fact irrelevant to the issue of 
parents’ rights to make medical decisions for their children and that 
courts should begin to recognize this irrelevance.  The cases involving 
such claims revolve almost entirely around issues that are largely 
unrelated to the parents’ religious exercise; in addition, it is unclear 
that they involve the sort of governmental coercion that is required in 
order to state a free exercise claim.  This Essay concludes by exploring 
the possible implications of recognizing the irrelevance of parental free 
exercise in medical decision-making cases. 
 ∗  Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law.  I would like to thank Marci Hamilton and the editors of the 
Cardozo Law Review for organizing this Symposium and inviting me to participate.  I would also 
like to thank Jonathan Entin, Jacqui Lipton, and Chris Lund for their valuable feedback, and 
Meagan Bielanin for extremely helpful research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith1 was viewed as a fundamental game-changer in the free exercise 
realm at the time it was decided,2 at least one area of the law has gone 
virtually untouched by the purported Smith revolution: the free exercise 
right to refuse medical treatment, by or on behalf of children.  Like most 
areas of constitutional doctrine, free exercise law has treated children 
with more or less massive neglect.3  Yet, even before the Free Exercise 
Clause was incorporated,4 and well before the Supreme Court’s 
monumental free exercise decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 lower 
courts—mostly state courts—have faced the question of when, if ever, 
parents may refuse medical treatment to their children for religious 
reasons.6  It is therefore particularly surprising that there has been very 
little in the way of systematic doctrinal development in this area. 
 1 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 2 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (“The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important 
development in the law of religious freedom in decades.”). 
 3 Very few Supreme Court cases deal directly with minors’ constitutional rights, even when 
minors are apparently involved in the litigation.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(adjudicating an Establishment Clause challenge to prayers at high school and middle school 
graduations without addressing the minors’ rights as distinct from those of their parents); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (addressing a challenge to a compulsory education 
law for children under sixteen but noting that its holding “in no degree depends on the assertion 
of the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents”); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (reviewing the conviction of an adult for having her niece 
sell religious literature in violation of state law, without distinguishing between the adult’s rights 
and the child’s); see also Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (noting that “[f]or almost two centuries, children were largely absent from the 
class of constitutional rights holders”).  The issue of children’s constitutional rights has, however, 
received sustained scholarly attention from some authors, including Professors Emily Buss, 
James Dwyer, Martha Minow, Lee Teitelbaum, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.  See, e.g., 
BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity 
Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355; Emily Buss, Children’s Associational 
Rights?: Why Less Is More, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101 (2003); James G. Dwyer, A 
Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 755 (2009); James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision 
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845 (2003); Martha Minow, 
Children’s Rights: Where We’ve Been, and Where We’re Going, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1573 (1995); 
Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 
173. 
 4 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 5 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 6 See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1933); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942). Because of their procedural posture, 
usually involving state law criminal or civil neglect or similar proceedings, the cases are most 
often decided in state court. 
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One can derive some general principles from the relatively 
disorderly body of case law pertaining to religious rights in the context 
of medical decision-making for children, of course.  As explained in 
Part I of this Essay, at least where a child is facing a very serious 
medical condition requiring immediate attention, courts will not refuse 
to intervene.  In cases in which the child’s medical condition is less than 
life-threatening or severely debilitating, the results are more mixed.  
Some courts will still intervene to require medical treatment for the 
child, whereas others will exercise restraint, deferring to the will of the 
parent or child. 
This Essay argues that the existence of a free exercise claim in 
cases involving medical treatment for children has, and in fact should 
have, virtually no effect on either subset of cases.  Though the courts 
often discuss parents’ free exercise rights, sometimes in conjunction 
with a Fourteenth Amendment parental rights claim, they rarely reason 
through the claim in any depth.  Rather, the cases dealing with the 
courts’ authority to order minors’ medical treatment usually center 
around issues such as the degree of harm to the child resulting from the 
treatment or the lack thereof, the child’s own wishes (in the case of 
older minors) and the reasonableness of denying care (for example, if 
the medical necessity of the proposed treatment is in doubt). 
Part II of this Essay seeks to explain why this set of factors and 
results has remained relatively constant, despite the supposed paradigm 
shift effected by Smith.  While Smith would seem to strengthen the 
claim of states seeking to intervene on behalf of children, it also 
confused matters in this realm by introducing the almost nonsensical 
“hybrid rights” doctrine into the mix.  Ultimately, however, as I argue in 
Part III, the bigger problem with applying the Free Exercise Clause to 
the issue of refusing medical treatment by or on behalf of minors is that 
these cases simply should not be seen to raise free exercise concerns.  
Both because these cases revolve almost entirely around issues that are 
largely unrelated to the parents’ religious exercise, and, perhaps more 
importantly, because it is unclear that they involve the sort of 
governmental coercion that is required in order to state a free exercise 
claim, free exercise doctrine provides an unsuitable paradigm for 
resolving the issues in medical decision-making cases.  Unfortunately, 
by failing to recognize this reality, the Smith Court simply deepened the 
confusion. 
After defending this view, Part III considers the implications of 
disassociating the Free Exercise Clause from this line of cases.  While 
the outcomes of specific cases may not be greatly affected by such a 
shift, this disassociation might cause legislatures to become more 
hesitant to adopt exemptions to child welfare laws for faith-healing 
parents.  In addition, it might be hoped that courts would begin to 
 1860 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 32:5 
 
grapple with the real, and difficult, questions that actually are 
implicated by this issue. 
 
I.     THE LEGAL BACKDROP BEFORE AND AFTER SMITH 
 
Cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment by or on 
behalf of minors may arise in either a civil or a criminal posture.  In the 
civil case, either a hospital seeks to intervene on behalf of a child to 
obtain a court order allowing medical treatment to go forward despite 
the parents’ refusal to consent, sometimes supported by the child’s 
refusal, or a children’s services agency seeks an adjudication that the 
child is abused or neglected for the purpose of getting the court to 
delegate to the state agency the power to make medical decisions for the 
child.7  In the criminal scenario, the state seeks to criminally prosecute 
parents for abuse, neglect, or manslaughter after a child has suffered 
harm or even died due to a lack of medical treatment.8
The proposition that the state has both the power and the duty to 
step in when children’s lives are endangered is not terribly 
controversial, and the case law in this area largely reflects that fact.9  
Thus, at least in the civil context, courts universally hold that lifesaving 
medical treatment can be required notwithstanding the parents’ sincere 
religious objections.10  For example, in 2004, a Nevada court ordered a 
 7 See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 272 (Colo. 1982); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 
1108, 1109 (Del. 1991); In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).  Yet another 
civil context in which this issue has been raised, though less commonly so, is that of a civil rights 
action against a hospital seeking to enjoin it from providing medical treatment against the 
parents’ wishes to children whose religion forbids it.  See, e.g., Novak v. Cobb Cnty.-Kennestone 
Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Washington v. 
King Cnty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam). 
 8 E.g., Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
 9 See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 570 So.2d 322, 331-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“The 
state, as parens patriae, has the responsibility to intervene between parent and child when there is 
demonstrated physical harm occurring to the child that puts a reasonable person on notice that 
medical intervention is necessary for the sake of the child’s life.”), rev’d on other grounds, 604 
So. 2d 775 (1992); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 100-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). 
 10 One possible counter-example is the case of Newmark v. Williams, in which the Delaware 
Supreme Court declined to order chemotherapy for a three-year-old child whose parents preferred 
faith healing.  Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1109-10.  The court based its holding partly on the parents’ 
rights and partly on the grounds that the therapy was not in the child’s best interest, given that the 
therapy itself was painful and risky, and that it would offer only a forty percent chance of 
survival.  Id. at 1115-21.  Many would argue, however, that forty percent odds are worth taking in 
such a case, especially given the likelihood that the child would die otherwise.  Indeed, the child 
did die shortly after the court’s decision was announced.  Id. at 1121 n.13.  Some parents have 
been spared prosecution after the fact when a child has died as a result of medical treatment being 
withheld for religious reasons.  But these rulings are based on due process grounds due to the 
vagueness of statutory faith-healing exemptions, rather than the parents’ free exercise rights.  See, 
e.g., Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 782 (reversing felony child abuse and murder conviction on due 
process grounds).  See generally Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in A Round Hole: 
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lifesaving blood transfusion for a newborn over the parents’ objections, 
and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.11  Though the Nevada 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the parents’ objections were based 
on their religious beliefs,12 the Free Exercise Clause was never 
discussed.  Indeed, the fact pattern and the result in that case echoed 
those of many cases reaching back several decades.13
While both the result and the reasoning may seem unsurprising in 
cases where a child’s life is endangered by a denial of treatment, the 
issue of non-lifesaving treatment is perhaps more difficult.  As a result, 
the cases are more mixed.  Sometimes courts will order the intervention 
and sometimes not, and it is difficult to discern any principle that 
dictates which course a court will follow.  For example, two early cases 
dealing with similar medical conditions afflicting older minors were 
decided in opposite ways within the same state.  In In re Sampson, the 
Ulster County, New York Family Court ordered surgery, over his 
mother’s religious objections, on a fifteen-year-old child with severe 
facial disfigurement.14  The court invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
statement in Prince v. Massachusetts that “[t]he right to practice 
religion freely does not include the liberty to expose the community or 
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”15  
That decision ran contrary to the earlier New York precedent of In re 
Seiferth, in which the New York Court of Appeals declined to require 
the lower court to order surgery on a fourteen-year-old with a cleft lip 
and palate, in the absence of any medical emergency.16  Of course, 
factual distinctions can be made between the cases.  Most notably, the 
Sampson case was decided by a lower court in an exercise of its wide 
discretion, whereas the earlier Seiferth case, decided by the state’s high 
court, questioned only whether the lower court’s exercise of discretion 
not to order the surgery was reasonable.  Nonetheless, the inconsistency 
in the two approaches is notable. 
By all indications, Smith has not assisted in regularizing the 
doctrinal landscape.  Both Sampson and Seiferth were decided pre-
Smith and even pre-Yoder, but even post-Smith cases exhibit the same 
Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith 
Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 43 (1994) (discussing the due process issues associated with 
faith healing prosecutions). 
 11 In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 87 P.3d 521, 522-23 (Nev. 2004). 
 12 Id. at 522, 526. 
 13 E.g., Morrison, 252 S.W.2d 97; People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 
1952). 
 14 In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641  (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970). 
 15 Id. at 650 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)). 
 16 In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (N.Y. 1955).  It should be noted that, although the 
father’s protest in Seiferth was based on his sincere spiritual belief in “letting ‘the forces of the 
universe work on the body,’” it is unclear whether the court treated this as a religious belief, 
making no mention of any First Amendment claim.  Id. at 822. 
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pattern of inconsistent results and vague doctrinal grounding.  In one 
case that came down shortly after Smith, for example, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals for the Twelfth District ordered gonorrhea treatment for a 
sixteen-year-old minor, notwithstanding the religious scruples of both 
the mother and the child.17  Considering both the Fourteenth 
Amendment parental rights claim and the First Amendment free 
exercise claim together, but without so much as mentioning the recent 
Smith decision, the court categorically concluded: 
The refusal of parents for religious reasons to allow medical 
treatment of their child is sufficient to justify a determination that the 
juvenile was a “dependent child” . . . .  We see no reason why a 
similar finding may not be made where the juvenile refuses further 
medical treatment for religious reasons.18
Similarly, one month after Smith was decided, the Texas Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s authorization of a blood transfusion 
for a sixteen-year-old Jehovah Witness minor who was facing surgery 
to repair a badly damaged arm, again without so much as mentioning 
Smith.19
Other than the total or near-total lack of attention paid to Smith in 
most of these cases dealing with parents’ rights to refuse treatment for 
their children for religious reasons, a few other commonalities appear.  
First, courts commonly cite Prince v. Massachusetts for the proposition 
that “[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves.  But it does 
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves,”20 and that 
the state is free to step into the private realm of the family when the 
child’s health or life is at risk.21
It is notable, moreover, that this pattern persists even in cases 
decided after Wisconsin v. Yoder.  Yoder held that the Amish were 
entitled to an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause from a 
compulsory education law that required their children to attend school 
until age sixteen, because the Amish belief system required those 
children to leave conventional schooling after the eighth grade.22  The 
Yoder case is widely understood as the high-water mark of free exercise 
 17 In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1139-41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
 18 Id. at 1141. 
 19 O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1990). 
 20 See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (citing Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1970) (same). 
 21 See, e.g., Morrison, 252 S.W.2d at 100 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67); O.G., 790 
S.W.2d at 841 (same). 
 22 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229 (1972). 
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rights in the parenting context.23  Yet, courts often refer to Yoder’s 
broad grant of parental rights in the same breath that they note Prince’s 
equally sweeping limitations on that right.  Rarely do courts attempt to 
reconcile the two cases, or to make sense of Smith’s role with respect to 
the issue.24  Indeed, reading a case such as In re D.L.E.,25 in which the 
court rejected parents’ right to deprive their minor child of treatment for 
epileptic seizures, one gets the impression that the result would have 
been the same before or after Yoder.  The court first cites Prince for the 
proposition that the state can limit the parents’ free exercise rights in 
order to protect a child’s wellbeing; it then cites Yoder for essentially 
the same proposition.26
Sometimes courts consider the wishes of older minors separate and 
apart from those of their parents, but in doing so, they struggle to 
articulate the precise importance of those wishes.  In In re E.G., the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that a mature27 seventeen-year-old minor 
could refuse treatment for leukemia on religious grounds, basing that 
decision on cases dealing with the common law and constitutional rights 
of mature minors but not on free exercise law.28  Similarly, in In re 
Green, the court suggested that the law, and in particular Yoder, 
supported the parents’ desire to withhold treatment for their sixteen-
year-old child’s scoliosis, but declined to issue a definitive decision 
without hearing from the child himself.29  Upon learning that the child’s 
wishes lined up with the parents’, the court decided that surgery was not 
required.30  The court in In re J.J., by contrast, suggested that a sixteen-
year-old minor with a sexually transmitted disease had no greater right 
to refuse treatment for himself than his mother would have to refuse it 
on his behalf.31
 23 See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1237, 1237 (1996). 
 24 See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 275-76 (Colo. 1982); Newmark v. Williams, 588 
A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991).  But see Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136-41 (D. 
Neb. 2006). 
 25 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982).  
 26 Id. at 275-76. 
 27 The appellate court had held that E.G. was “mature” under the state’s Emancipation of 
Mature Minors Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/3-2 (1985), according to which a minor over the 
age of sixteen “who has demonstrated the capacity to manage his own affairs may be partially or 
completely emancipated and granted whatever rights and responsibilities the court may specify.”  
In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 N.E.2d 322 
(Ill. 1989). 
 28 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325-28 (Ill. 1989). 
 29 In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 390-93 (Pa. 1972). 
 30 In re Green, 307 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1973). 
 31 In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“The refusal of parents for 
religious reasons to allow medical treatment of their child is sufficient to justify a determination 
that the juvenile was a ‘dependent child’ within the meaning of R.C. 2151.04(C).  We see no 
reason why a similar finding may not be made where the juvenile refuses further medical 
treatment for religious reasons.  While it is true that an adult can refuse medical treatment on 
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To summarize, courts seem to be relatively consistent in ordering 
medical treatment over parents’ religious objections in the face of 
serious risks to a child’s life or health.  Results are more mixed when 
the medical condition is less grave.  In all cases, however, the analysis 
of the free exercise claim tends to be relatively perfunctory.  Rarely 
does Smith play an important role.  Part II explores some possible 
reasons behind this phenomenon, arguing that the Smith Court missed 
an opportunity to clarify the law in this area and instead introduced 
greater confusion to an already disordered doctrinal field. 
 
II.     WHAT SMITH DID NOT DO 
 
Despite Smith’s landmark status and central importance in the free 
exercise realm, it has not played a significant role in cases dealing with 
parents’ rights to refuse medical treatment for their children on religious 
grounds.  Nor has it helped to clarify the analytical framework for 
deciding such cases.  This Part attempts to explain this phenomenon, 
presenting several factors that explain Smith’s failure to influence courts 
in this area.  Part III then argues that not just Smith, but the Free 
Exercise Clause itself, is irrelevant to parents’ medical decision-making 
power over their children. 
In some ways, one might have expected Smith to clarify the law in 
this area.  Smith’s fairly broad holding that no religious exemptions are 
constitutionally required when a law is neutral and generally 
applicable32 would seem clearly to foreclose any individual’s claim for 
a religiously based exception to the requirements of medical or general 
neglect laws in effect in all states.  Surely, such laws are neutral and 
generally applicable, as they do not, and unquestionably were not 
intended to, target religion specifically.33  Rather, they apply to all 
parents and children across the board;34 indeed, if they make any 
exceptions at all, they usually exempt adherents of faith-healing 
religious grounds, the law does not grant a similar right to a juvenile.  Thus, despite a juvenile’s 
progressive capacity, one who is under the age of majority has not reached the age of full and 
legal discretion.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 32 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). 
 33 See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
535 (1990) (describing a law that targets religion and is therefore not neutral or generally 
applicable). 
 34 For example, Connecticut’s neglect statute reaches “[a]ny person who, with criminal 
negligence, deprives another person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care.”  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20(a)(2) (2011).  Illinois’ child endangerment law states: “It is unlawful 
for any person to willfully cause or permit the life or health of a child under the age of 18 to be 
endangered or to willfully cause or permit a child to be placed in circumstances that endanger the 
child's life or health.”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-21.6(a) (2010). 
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religions from the requirements of the law.35  If there had ever been a 
claim under the pre-Smith regime that courts must refrain from 
interfering with parents’ religiously-motivated decisions to refuse 
medical treatment for their children, at least in some circumstances,36 
there is no longer an obvious path to reaching that conclusion under 
Smith’s general rule. 
In addition, Smith seemed to revive the belief-conduct distinction 
under the Free Exercise Clause, which is most commonly associated 
with the Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States,37 but which had 
been thrown into question by Wisconsin v. Yoder.38  Thus, in the face of 
the respondents’ claim “that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is 
accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the 
conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation,” the Smith 
Court insisted, “[w]e have never held that, and decline to do so now.”39  
Instead, the Court maintained a distinction between pure belief and 
conduct, even when the conduct is religiously motivated.40  If anything 
qualifies as regulable conduct rather than pure belief, of course, it would 
seem to be providing or denying medical care to another person.  While 
parents are free to believe whatever they wish about the power of faith 
and prayer to heal their children, the child abuse and neglect laws are 
unquestionably aimed at conduct, not belief, and therefore demand 
compliance under Reynolds and Smith.41
Indeed, to the extent that Smith revived some of the reasoning of 
Reynolds, it is noteworthy that the Reynolds Court was particularly 
 35 See generally James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child 
Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Observers, 
74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1353-54 & n.127 (1996) (noting that the neglect laws of forty-six states 
contain exemptions for faith healing and citing sources on faith healing exemptions).  
 36 Of course, even under Yoder, the religious parents’ rights may be overridden by the state’s 
showing of a compelling state interest.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (noting 
that “only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”).  Where the medical treatment is needed to 
avoid death or serious debilitation of the child, it seems indisputable that the compelling state 
interest standard would be met.  Id. at 230, 233-34.  Thus, even before Smith, the state’s power to 
order treatment for children was in doubt only in those cases where the medical intervention was 
not life-saving or otherwise immediately necessary. 
 37 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
 38 406 U.S. at 219-20 (“This case . . . does not become easier because respondents were 
convicted for their ‘actions' in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this 
context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.”). 
 39 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 40 Id. 
 41 At the same time, the belief-conduct distinction may be rather tenuous in certain 
circumstances, and there is no doubt that the spiritual and the physical intertwine in many 
respects under religious doctrine.  In addition, some religions draw an explicit connection 
between the parent’s religious observance and the child’s health.  One court noted, for example, 
that some Christian Scientists believe “that childhood illnesses were . . . manifestations of their 
parents’ own spiritual infirmities.”  Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1109 n.2 (Del. 1991). 
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troubled by the prospect of protecting religiously-motivated conduct 
that threatened harm to others besides the religious individual.  Thus, 
the Court in Reynolds, in passing on anti-polygamy laws, discussed the 
example of religiously-motivated human sacrifice.42
At the same time, however, Smith instituted two exceptions to the 
rule that neutral laws regulating conduct apply without accommodation 
for religious individuals, and both of those exceptions appear to cut in 
the opposite direction, suggesting that Smith’s general rule is not 
applicable to parents’ medical decision-making on behalf of their 
children.  First, the Court suggested that Yoder’s essence was preserved 
because it involved a so-called “hybrid” rights claim.43  Second, it 
preserved the precedent of Sherbert v. Verner, in which the Court 
required the state to provide unemployment compensation to a Seventh-
Day Adventist who was fired from her job for her religiously compelled 
refusal to work on Saturdays.44  In asserting that Sherbert remained 
good law, the Smith Court explained, “where the State has in place a 
system of individual exemptions,” as in the unemployment 
compensation context, “it may not refuse to extend that system to cases 
of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”45
On their face, both of these exceptions would appear to apply when 
parental medical decision-making is at issue.  The Yoder exception 
applies because every one of those cases involves not just free exercise 
but also the substantive due process right of parents to control the 
upbringing of their children.  And indeed, this “parental right,” along 
with the rights of free speech and free association, was singled out by 
the Smith Court.46  To be sure, as Professor James Dwyer points out, 
this “hybrid rights” language has created widespread confusion and is, 
more importantly, logically incoherent.47  And the Court’s reference to 
the special treatment given to combined free exercise and parenting 
claims is undercut by the Court’s assurance that the First Amendment 
 42 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67 (“Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a 
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government 
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”). 
 43 The Court in Smith used the term “hybrid” to refer to cases in which a free exercise claim 
was asserted along with another constitutional claim, such as a free speech or parental rights 
claim.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.  The Court implied that courts might recognize a right to an 
exemption from a generally applicable law in such cases.  Id. 
 44 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400-02 (1963). 
 45 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 46 Id. at 881-82. 
 47 James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for 
Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1787 (2011) (describing the “vagueness and illogic” of 
the hybrid rights concept); see also, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When A “Rule” 
Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights 
Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 587-602 (2003) (attributing the lack of success for hybrid 
rights claims in the lower courts, in part, to the “analytical difficulty in conceptualizing how 
hybrid claims fit into free exercise jurisprudence”). 
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“does not require” subjecting child neglect laws to strict scrutiny.48  
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Court embraced the factually and 
legally analogous Yoder scenario as the paradigm case in which strict 
scrutiny should be applied to a free exercise claim.49
Similarly, the Sherbert exception, which applies where the 
“context . . . len[ds] itself to individualized governmental assessment of 
the reasons for the relevant conduct,” would at least arguably govern 
medical decision-making cases as well.50  As noted above, the question 
of whether a religious exemption is required from otherwise-neutral 
laws requiring parents to provide medical care for their children often 
arises in contexts in which individualized assessment is available, such 
as when a court is asked by a hospital or agency to intervene on behalf 
of an individual minor.  Indeed, the free exercise argument is not the 
only one that might be raised in such circumstances; a minor might seek 
to avoid treatment, for example, based on the argument that she is 
mature enough to refuse consent on her own, as an adult could do.51  
Thus, like the unemployment and zoning variance contexts, the context 
of neglect and dependency hearings lends itself to case-by-case 
decision-making, in which religious reasons arguably must be given 
equal standing with other reasons for exempting individuals from the 
general rule. 
Thus, Smith understandably has had little effect on courts’ 
approach to cases involving parents’ rights to refuse medical treatment 
for their children on religious grounds.  Although the Smith decision 
might, at first glance, appear to offer greater protection for children in 
this context, it contains enough language pointing in the opposite 
direction that it has failed to provide any meaningful guidance on the 
issue.  Part III of this Essay suggests that Smith’s failure to provide 
guidance on this issue is indicative of the fundamental inappropriateness 
of treating medical decision-making cases as religious exemption cases.  
 48 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89; Dwyer, supra note 47. 
 49 At first blush, the Amish parents in Yoder who wished to keep their children out of school 
after the age of fourteen may seem very different from the parents seeking to deny their children 
medical treatment.  Yet Yoder clearly involved the state’s ability to protect the children’s physical 
welfare to some extent: compulsory education laws, after all, were designed in part to combat 
child labor, and laboring was precisely what the Amish children would be required to do when 
they were out of school.  Moreover, the Yoder holding also affected the state’s ability to protect 
children’s education and social welfare, which is often at issue in cases involving the state’s 
power to order surgery for children with somewhat debilitating, but not life-threatening, 
conditions.  See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (seeking to 
protect the child’s chance for a “normal, happy existence”). 
 50 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 51 See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. 1989) (dealing with the claim of a minor, 
just six months shy of her eighteenth birthday, to refuse medical treatment for leukemia, on the 
grounds that she was sufficiently mature to decide to refuse lifesaving treatment based on her 
religious beliefs and noting that “[n]umerous exceptions are found in this jurisdiction and others 
which treat minors as adults under specific circumstances”). 
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That Part explains that the framework of free exercise doctrine is simply 
a poor fit for these cases. 
 
III.     THE FREE EXERCISE RED HERRING 
 
This Essay argues that, for all the sound and fury surrounding the 
rights of parents to make religiously-based medical decisions for their 
children, these cases are not about, and should not be understood to be 
about, the Free Exercise Clause at all.  As I explain below, these cases 
serve neither the goal of “nondiscrimination” nor that of “substantive 
equality” for religious believers—the two primary values served by Free 
Exercise Clause doctrine.  They are not properly characterized as 
religious exemption cases.  Yet, Smith’s reaffirmation of Yoder, as well 
as its mixed signals with regard to the proper level of scrutiny for 
medical decision-making claims, has only perpetuated the error. 
Some of the medical treatment cases—particularly those involving 
young children, non-lifesaving treatments, and religious parents—are 
indeed difficult.  But they are not difficult because they involve religion, 
and it is time that courts grasped the fact that religion has no special role 
to play here.  Instead, these cases revolve around the difficult questions 
of what constitutes medical necessity and how much deference various 
decision-makers should receive; what constitutes a “normal” life and to 
what extent the state is entitled to impose its concept of normality on 
individual children; and whether and under what circumstances children 
are entitled to decision-making autonomy.  In other words, they 
consider whether the procedure is in the minor’s best interests, as well 
as, in certain cases, whether the minor is mature enough to decide to 
decline care on her own.  Part III.A thus defends the view that the Free 
Exercise Clause is simply not implicated by these medical neglect cases.  
Rather than further muddying the waters, the Smith Court could and 
should have taken the opportunity to clarify that parents’ free exercise 
rights are not affected by laws requiring medical treatment for their 
children.  Part III.B then considers what consequences, if any, might 
arise from viewing this issue in the way I propose. 
 
A.     The Relative Irrelevance of Religion 
 
Fundamentally, it seems that the medical decision-making cases 
revolve around two core questions, whether a free exercise claim is 
raised or not.  The first question is that of medical necessity and harm to 
the child—whether the medical intervention sought to be imposed by 
the state is truly needed to protect the child’s health, and the degree of 
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harm that would result if it were denied.  After all, despite the apparent 
tension between Yoder and Smith with respect to this issue in particular, 
there is virtual consensus across Supreme Court free exercise precedent 
that the state can intervene to protect the child’s physical or mental 
well-being, even when the child’s life is not in danger.  The Court’s 
statements in Prince v. Massachusetts that “[t]he right to practice 
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the 
child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death,” and 
that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom 
and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare”52 have not been 
undermined, and in fact have been reinforced by the subsequent cases of 
Yoder, Smith, and even Parham v. J.R.53  The concept of “health” in 
Prince, moreover, may be broad enough to encompass the child’s 
mental and emotional health.54  Indeed, Yoder’s holding that Amish 
parents could keep their children out of school after the eighth grade 
relied heavily on the Court’s finding that the children’s mental and 
physical health would not suffer as a result; were it otherwise, the Court 
well may have upheld that application of the state’s compulsory 
education law to those children.55
Because the language of those cases regarding the “life and health 
exception” to parental authority is so broad, courts’ decisions must 
instead revolve around medical facts, such as the need for, and risks 
associated with, the proposed intervention.  In Newmark v. Williams, for 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court mentioned Prince, Yoder, and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,56 but its decision ultimately turned on “two 
basic inquiries,” both pertaining to the best interests of the child: first, 
“the effectiveness of the treatment and . . . the child’s chances of 
survival with and without the medical care,” and second, “the nature of 
 52 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
 53 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Nonetheless, we have recognized that a state is not without 
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or 
mental health is jeopardized.” (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince, 321 
U.S. at 166)). 
 54 Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70 (noting the “harmful possibilities” that might arise from 
allowing an exception to child labor laws for street proselytizing, including “emotional 
excitement and psychological or physical injury”). 
 55 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-29 (describing the Amish upbringing as “an ‘ideal’ vocational 
education” and the benefit to Amish children from additional formal schooling as “at best . . . 
speculative,” and concluding that any “inference” that “the Amish employment of their children 
on family farms is in any way deleterious to their health” would be “contrary to the record before 
us”); cf. Murphy v. Ark., 852 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting parents’ argument 
that their children should be exempted from standardized school testing due to the parents’ 
religious beliefs, including the argument that parents’ testing at home sufficiently protected the 
state’s interest in the quality of the children’s education). 
 56 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a state law requiring public school attendance 
for all children unconstitutionally “interfere[s] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct 
the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
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the treatments and their effect on the child.”57  Indeed, as Kent 
Greenawalt has pointed out, “[b]y and large, the best strategy for 
judicial deference to parental choice about medical procedures for their 
children concentrates on the kind of procedure involved, not the exact 
grounds of parental judgment.”58
The second fundamental question at issue in these cases is how the 
decision-making authority should be allocated among parent, state, and 
child.  This is a fundamental question of family law and substantive due 
process—and, indeed, of political philosophy as well.59  In suggesting 
that children have a “right” to a “normal” life, for example,60 courts are 
inevitably imposing a vision of what constitutes “normal,” and 
implicitly deciding that the state is entitled to determine and impose 
such normalcy. 
The proper allocation of decision-making authority is not, 
however, a question that presents itself in any unique way when the 
Free Exercise Clause is invoked.  Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason 
that courts often treat the parental rights claim as identical to the free 
exercise claim or behave as though the one claim is subsumed by the 
other.61  It is unclear why the right of parents to make decisions on 
behalf of their children based on their own best judgment, which is 
protected both by the Fourteenth Amendment and the common law, 
should be any stronger simply because the parents’ reasoning is based 
on their religious beliefs.  The fact that a parenting claim is involved, in 
other words, tends to supersede rather than strengthen the free exercise 
claim.  As Professor Dwyer argues, moreover, the parenting context is a 
particularly poor fit for free exercise claims, since the claim generally 
 57 Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1991). 
 58 Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make A 
Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810 (2006).  This view is arguably in line with Marci 
Hamilton’s assertion, moreover, that a concern with preventing harm to the child should be at the 
center of the free exercise decision-making in this area.  MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 32, 304-05 (2005).  Greenawalt continues, however, 
by suggesting that “in some instances the special strength of religious claims against treatment 
should make a difference.”  Greenawalt, supra. 
 59 The opinion in Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952), strikingly illustrates 
the philosophical overtones to this issue.  Although in that case the parents had raised a free 
exercise claim in seeking to refuse a blood transfusion for their newborn, the court quickly 
dismissed the First Amendment claim, then proceeded with a lengthy discourse on the 
relationship among parent, child, and state, which traversed Aristotle, Blackstone, and the 
Declaration of Independence, to conclude that the state had a right to intervene on behalf of the 
child.  Id. at 101-03. 
 60 See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970); cf. In re Hudson, 
126 P.2d 765, 792 (Simpson, J., dissenting). 
 61 See, e.g., Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139-40, 1142 (D. Neb. 2006) 
(dealing with parents’ claim for an exemption from newborn metabolic disease screening and 
largely treating the parental rights claim in conjunction with the free exercise claim); see also 
generally Dwyer, supra note 47, at 1787 (describing courts’ fairly universal skepticism toward 
hybrid rights claims involving parental rights, especially in medical treatment cases). 
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involves the parent’s assertion of a right to affect another person in a 
way that is harmful to that person.62   This is unlike other free exercise 
cases in which, like in Smith itself, the harm to others caused by the 
desired exemption, if any, is diffuse or difficult to identify.63
Purely as a descriptive matter, then, parents’ free exercise claims 
rarely appear to carry much, if any, analytic weight in cases involving 
medical decision-making for minors.  There may be several reasons for 
this.  For example, such cases are largely decided by state trial courts, 
which must work quickly due to the time-sensitive nature of the 
decision-making in most instances.  There is thus less time to argue and 
analyze any possible free exercise claims.  Moreover, in theory, at least, 
state judges—and possibly the attorneys arguing before them, as well—
are more comfortable with analyzing state statutes than with resolving 
questions of federal constitutional law.  But more importantly, one 
might also perceive in those courts’ relatively perfunctory treatment of 
free exercise precedent64 a sense that Smith, its predecessors, and its 
progeny are not entirely germane. 
As numerous commentators have explained, there are roughly two 
different approaches to understanding the Free Exercise Clause.65  
 62 Professor Dwyer’s essay states:  
[T]he parenting context is less—rather than more—appropriate for religious 
exemptions, contrary to the tenor of Smith’s handling of Yoder.  First, the right-holder 
claim in parenting cases is, properly viewed, quite weak, and arguably incoherent and 
illicit.  It is at least weak, because the right holder—the parent—is not complaining 
about the state interfering with his or her self-determination the way Mr. Smith was 
and the way most people are when alleging a violation of their rights.  Rather, the 
supposed right holder is complaining about the state interfering with his or her control 
of another person’s life.  Simply as a conceptual matter, a demand for control of 
another person’s life must be weaker than a demand for control of one’s own life, 
regardless of the relationship one has with the other person. 
Dwyer, supra note 47, at 1788.  In addition, he notes the problem that children will be treated 
unequally with respect to medical treatment, depending on whether or not their parents have 
religious objections to the treatment.  Id. at 1788-89. 
 63 In the unemployment compensation cases, for example, the cost of the employee’s free 
exercise is borne by a large number of employers, rather than being concentrated in one 
individual. 
 64 Cf. Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Medical Decision Making for 
and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 314 & 
n.16 (1994) (noting “the paucity of deeply reasoned cases in the field” and suggesting that it may 
partly reflect “what might euphemistically be described as a low level of sensitivity to the 
precedential potential at the initial stages of building up a constitutional jurisprudence of family 
law”). 
 65 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 54-
55 (2007) (stating that “[a] law is formally neutral if it does not use religion as a category—if 
religious and secular examples of the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same,” whereas 
“[a] law is substantively neutral if it neither ‘encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or 
disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.’” (quoting Douglas Laycock, 
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 
1001 (1990)); Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and 
Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2010).  Professor Laycock first introduced 
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Some scholars primarily view the Free Exercise Clause as serving the 
goal of formal neutrality, or nondiscrimination.  This approach holds 
that the Constitution requires only that religion be treated on equal 
terms with nonreligion.  Others see the Free Exercise Clause as 
vindicating a right to substantive neutrality or substantive equality.  The 
substantive neutrality approach entails the view that true religious 
liberty requires that religious individuals be given the right to practice 
their religion, even if they are treated better in some circumstances than 
those who have no religious claim.  In the exemptions context, this 
means that religious observers may be entitled to exemptions for 
religious reasons, even where a rule is otherwise neutral and generally 
applicable and admits of no equivalent secular exemptions.66  As 
Christopher Lund points out, “[n]ondiscrimination approaches tend to 
emphasize equality while substantive approaches tend to emphasize 
liberty.”67  Neither approach, however, justifies or explains the 
purported right of parents to withhold medical treatment from their 
children on religious grounds. 
It should be readily apparent that the value of formal neutrality or 
equality does not require that religious parents be given exemptions 
from neglect laws that do not permit parents to deny care for secular 
reasons.  Under a formal neutrality analysis, there is no reason why the 
analytic process should be any different for Colin Newmark, the three-
year-old boy suffering from leukemia whose parents were Christian 
Scientists, than for Joseph Hofbauer, a seven-year-old boy afflicted with 
Hodgkin’s disease, whose parents chose to pursue treatment with 
laetrile, as recommended by their medical practitioner.68  
At first glance, a substantive neutrality model might appear to 
explain the case of religious exemptions in the medical decision-making 
context more fully.  As Professor Lund explains, “[s]mall religious 
minorities often want idiosyncratic things—they demand rights that no 
one else wants.  As a result of their nonmainstream beliefs, they are 
often burdened by laws that burden no one else.”69  A norm of 
substantive neutrality would recognize that religious believers are not 
truly free to exercise their religion unless their unique needs are 
accommodated and their unique burdens alleviated.  In the medical 
decision-making context, one might point out that most parents wish to 
seek conventional medical care for their children; parents belonging to 
faith healing sects are uniquely burdened by legal requirements that 
the terms “formal neutrality” and “substantive neutrality” in his earlier article, Formal, 
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra. 
 66 See Lund, supra note 65, at 354. 
 67 Id. at 354. 
 68 In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1979).  Laetrile is a drug, briefly believed 
by some to be effective in treating cancer, that was never approved by the FDA. 
 69 Lund, supra note 65, at 359. 
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force them to seek medical care.  A substantive neutrality model would 
seek to accommodate those parents. 
As a doctrinal matter, however, it is highly questionable whether it 
makes sense to conceptualize the problem of religiously-based medical 
decision-making by parents as a problem of religious exemptions.  
Although different notions of substantive neutrality are imaginable, in 
the world of constitutional doctrine, the only concern is with coercive 
government action that impinges on believers’ liberty to believe or to 
practice.70  In the absence of such coercion, however burdened religious 
observers may feel by a particular state of affairs, there is no 
constitutionally relevant burden on the religious beliefs, and no injury to 
the value of substantive neutrality under the framework of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
When parental medical decision-making is involved, we should not 
be too quick to assume that coercive government action is threatening 
the parents’ rights.  The legal and regulatory backdrop here—unlike in 
most or all of the standard “exemption” cases—is extraordinarily 
amorphous.  In the usual exemption case, the government regulates in a 
way that burdens the individual’s religious practice—for example, by 
forbidding her to do something their religion requires, such as using a 
particular drug during religious worship.71  In the absence of such a 
regulation that burdens religious practice, the individual would be free 
to do as she chooses. 
By contrast, in the medical decision-making cases, where parents 
are seeking exemptions from generally applicable abuse or neglect laws, 
it is not entirely clear that parents would have the liberty to make 
medical decisions for their children in all circumstances, even in the 
absence of those laws.  This is particularly evident in the case of older 
minors.  On the one hand, the common law rule in most states is that 
parental consent is required for medical interventions on minors; on the 
other hand, statutory or common-law “mature minor” rules, combined 
with rules that permit minors to seek medical care without parental 
consent in certain sensitive areas—such as treatment for sexually 
transmitted diseases, prenatal care and pregnancy, and mental health 
service—undermine that general rule in enough cases that one may well 
question whether parents really possess a fundamental liberty to make 
medical decisions for their older children in the vast majority of cases.72  
 70 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
313, 319-20 (1996) (describing substantive neutrality as opposing government coercion with 
respect to religious belief or conduct). 
 71 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).  Of course, Smith began as a claim for 
unemployment benefits, but by the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal 
legal issue was whether a law criminalizing the use of peyote required an exemption for religious 
use. 
 72 As an example of the patchwork of regulation in this area, New York law generally 
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If they do not possess any such power, it is not clear that the Free 
Exercise Clause, under any interpretation, can affirmatively empower 
them to do so by requiring courts to prevent such interventions from 
going forward.  Instead, one might argue that no constitutional right of 
the parents is implicated here at all. 
Moreover, and perhaps more to the point, the notion that parents 
have a free exercise right to deny medical treatment to their children 
seems to assume that there is no relevant constitutional right on the part 
of the child—either to decision-making autonomy, in the case of older 
children, or simply to protection from harm, in the case of younger 
children.  It is not apparent that any background law—be it natural law 
or constitutional law—grants this power to parents over their children.73  
Indeed, some courts have held, for example, that abuse of children at the 
hands of a state actor violates their constitutional right to bodily 
integrity.74  Arguably, it is that bodily integrity right, rather than the free 
exercise right of the parent, that is at stake in these cases.   
The Supreme Court cases dealing with minors’ rights to seek 
abortion without parental involvement are potentially instructive here.  
The Supreme Court has decided that a minor has a constitutional right 
to seek an abortion on her own, without parental consent, if she 
persuades a judge either that she is sufficiently mature and well-
informed to make the decision herself, or that the abortion would be in 
her best interests.75  The so-called “minor abortion cases” were decided 
against the same patchwork of background laws that generally grants 
parents the authority, under the common law, to make medical 
treatment decisions for their children.  To the extent that some parents 
may seek to obstruct their child’s decision to obtain an abortion, it is 
likely that the opposition in many, if not most, cases will be based on 
the parents’ religious beliefs.  Yet in granting a specific medical 
decision-making right to some minors, the Supreme Court weighed the 
interests of the minor, the parent, and the state, without giving any 
provides that children may consent to medical care at the age of eighteen.  N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW § 2504(1) (2010).  However, minors are also considered to be capable of consenting on 
behalf of their own children, as well as for prenatal care, if they are married or pregnant, id. § 
2504(2), and they are entitled to seek care without parental consent in cases of medical 
emergency, id. § 2504(4).  In addition, minors may consent on their own to treatment for certain 
mental health, substance abuse, and sexual health services.  N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 
22.11(c), 33.21(c) (2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305(2).  Indeed, if parents can seek 
religious exemptions to child abuse and neglect statutes, one must question whether they may 
also seek exemptions to these mature minor, medical emergency, and other similar provisions. 
 73 Cf. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (“Children come into the world 
helpless, subject to all the ills to which flesh is heir.  They are entitled to the benefit of all laws 
made for their protection—whether affecting their property, their personal rights or their 
persons—by the Legislature, the sovereign power of the State.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that children have a substantive due process right not to be abused in a foster home). 
 75 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality). 
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particular weight to the parents’ religion or suggesting that any 
freestanding free exercise claim might exist.76  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has quite recently re-affirmed—or at least assumed—that minors 
have a constitutional right to seek an abortion without parental consent 
when their health would otherwise be endangered.77  As I have argued 
elsewhere, it is hard to understand such a statement as anything other 
than a claim that minors have a substantive due process right to protect 
their own health.78
It is no surprise, then, that the Court has consistently treated the 
parents’ religious beliefs as simply one factor among many that may be 
involved in their attempt to control their child’s decision, rather than as 
the central constitutional issue.79  Indeed, as Justice Marshall explained, 
“parents’ right to direct their children’s upbringing is a right against 
state interference with family matters”;80 it is not, however, a right to 
enlist the power of the state to assist in controlling the child.  Depending 
on how one understands the background rules and obligations 
concerning children’s rights to receive medical care, it may be the case 
that parents do not have any particular entitlement, even in the absence 
 76 Id. at 633-39 (reaching its decision after acknowledging the minor’s rights and interests, 
the “tradition of parental authority,” and the “special interest of the State in encouraging an 
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision 
whether or not to bear a child”); see also id. at 638 (noting, without further exploring the First 
Amendment implications, that “affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious, or political 
beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to 
the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice”). 
 77 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (noting the 
state’s “conce[ssion] that, under our cases, it would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a 
manner that subjects minors to significant health risks”). 
 78 B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of 
Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 330 & n.278 (2007).  Again, the role of medical 
professionals, and the question of the appropriate degree of deference to their medical decision-
making, is implicated in all of these cases.   This issue is involved in both the determination of 
harm to the child and the allocation of decision-making authority.  Courts tend to give substantial 
weight to the medical professional’s opinion, since the specialized knowledge they possess is 
generally beyond the ken of most judges.  Judith S. Stern & Claire V. Merkine, Brian L. v. 
Administration for Children's Services: Ambivalence Toward Gender Identity Disorder as a 
Medical Condition, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 566, 580 (2009) (discussing the “great deference” 
that “courts traditionally accord . . . to the expressed views of medical professionals”).  At the 
same time, the concept of medical necessity may be extremely vague in some cases—a fact that 
may militate against deferring entirely to the medical professional.  Is pain management during 
pregnancy required in order to protect a minor’s health, for example?  Can parents require 
medical treatment for children with terminal illnesses who wish to forego it and seek only 
palliation?  Should parents, courts, or physicians have the authority to decide whether a child 
should receive cochlear implants, or procedures to eliminate disfiguring conditions that do not 
interfere with the child’s physical functioning?  In the absence of a clear understanding about the 
proper allocation of authority among parent, state, child, and medical professional, there is a 
danger that courts may abdicate their decision-making role. 
 79 See id. at 637-38; H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409, 438 n.24 (1981). 
 80 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 471 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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of state regulation, to consent to medical treatment for older minors, or 
even to grant or withhold consent to standard medical treatment for 
younger minors. 
In any case, it is difficult to see why the minor abortion cases 
should get such radically different treatment from other medical 
treatment cases involving minors.  Of course, the former tend to involve 
older minors—but most courts do not express the view that the age of 
the minor affects the nature or applicability of the parents’ free exercise 
claims.  In addition, the minor abortion cases have arisen in a different 
procedural posture than the other medical treatment cases, as the minor 
abortion cases were brought either by an individual minor patient or an 
abortion provider against a state actor, challenging the constitutionality 
of a state law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion 
decision.  In this posture, there is no real opportunity for a parental-
rights or free-exercise claim to arise directly.81  Relatedly, unlike the 
other medical-treatment cases, the minor abortion cases involve a 
scenario in which the state is allied with the parents and seeking to 
support their constitutional interests; in the other medical treatment 
cases, the state is positioned in opposition to the parents and seeking to 
vindicate what it perceives to be the child’s interest. 
Nonetheless, the similarities are significant and potentially fruitful.  
This Essay argues that the minor abortion cases, in contrast to the other 
medical decision-making cases, take the correct approach to the issue of 
parents’ medical decision-making on behalf of their children.82  The 
Free Exercise Clause simply has no role to play here, particularly 
insofar as it suggests that parents who wish to deny care to their 
children may in some cases have a right to an “exemption” that would 
allow them to do so. 
 
B.     Implications 
 
If it is true, as I argue here, that the Free Exercise Clause is not 
implicated by parents’ decisions to seek or deny medical treatment for 
 81 Of course, copious amicus briefs have been filed in such cases, some of which raise free 
exercise issues.  See Brief of the Knights of Columbus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 
in No. 88-805, and Respondents-Cross-Petitioners in Nos. 88-1125 and 88-1309, Ohio v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Nos. 88-805, 88-1125, 88-1309), 1989 WL 
1127516 at *12-15 (discussing parental rights and free exercise rights in support of laws requiring 
parental notification for minors seeking abortions); Brief of Amici Curiae Catholic League for 
Religious & Civil Rights, the Michigan District Lutheran Church (Missouri Synod), the Michigan 
District, Christian Reformed Church in North America in Support of Appellants Francis X. 
Bellotti, et al., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), 1979 WL 199887 at *11-18. 
 82 Cf. Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 72-76 (1999) 
(arguing that the minor abortion cases can provide a model for identifying and taking into account 
a minors’ free exercise rights). 
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their children for religious reasons, what consequences should follow 
from this view?  Since courts already devote relatively little analytical 
energy to such claims on their own merits, it may be that the outcomes 
of most cases would not change if the free exercise claim were simply 
eliminated.  The recognition that the Free Exercise Clause is not 
applicable to these cases might have several other implications, 
however. 
First, numerous state legislatures have adopted exemptions to child 
welfare laws for faith-healing practices.  Although those exemptions are 
more likely the result of successful lobbying by religious groups than of 
a belief that the Constitution requires them,83 some legislators may have 
been influenced, at least in part, by a belief that the federal Free 
Exercise Clause requires some accommodation of religious parents in 
this context.  If the Free Exercise Clause were seen to exert no influence 
in this area, however, those legislators might be more inclined to repeal 
their religious exemptions.  Although courts might still take religious 
belief into consideration in evaluating mens rea when parents are 
criminally convicted for failure to seek medical care for their children, 
they would not need to consider any free exercise defense. 
Moreover, the issues raised by these cases, as discussed above, are 
significant and in many respects unresolved.  Indeed, the area of 
medical decision-making by and for children is sorely in need of 
analytic clarity.  To the extent that there is a constitutional dimension to 
the issue, moreover, it may be with respect to children’s rights to 
autonomy and protection—that is, with respect to their rights to bodily 
integrity—but that concept has received very little attention outside the 
context of the “minor abortion cases.”84  As it currently stands, the field 
of medical decision-making for minors is governed by a patchwork of 
rules, including not just constitutional doctrine but also mature minor 
laws, informed consent doctrine, common law parental rights, and 
various statutes that give minors the ability to consent to treatment in 
specific areas—such as treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, 
mental illnesses, and substance abuse—and withhold it in others—such 
as abortion.85  Removing the free exercise red herring from the picture 
 83 See HAMILTON, supra note 58, at 31.  Professor Hamilton explains that several states 
enacted exemptions because it appeared that they were required to do so in order to receive 
federal funding for certain child-related services.  See also James G. Dwyer, supra note 35, at 
1353-63 (discussing the prevalence of religious exemptions in laws requiring medical care for 
children). 
 84 Indeed, even those cases arguably revolve around something other than minors’ rights to 
autonomy and bodily integrity.  See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 213-44 (2005) (arguing that the minor abortion cases are really about solving a public 
health problem—namely, teen pregnancy). 
 85 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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might at least encourage courts to confront some of the more pressing 
issues in this area head-on. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is time for courts to recognize that the Free Exercise Clause 
simply has no application in cases involving parents’ rights to refuse 
medical treatment for their minor children.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, rather than clarifying this 
point, only added to the confusion.  If courts were to abandon the free 
exercise framework altogether in this particular domain, however, they 
might move toward a more productive resolution of the very thorny 
issues involved, such as the meaning of medical necessity and the 
proper allocation of decision-making authority. 
